30 March 2009

(Professor looks at Obama’s foreign policy, relations with Russia, more)
(begin transcript)

INTRODUCTION

Narrator:

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization, or NATO, celebrates the 60th anniversary of its founding on April 4, 2009.  In 1949, NATO’s mission was clear. Today, NATO faces a different world in which the Cold War has ended and a range of new challenges are combining to produce a never-before-seen security environment.

To help us understand these challenges and the role of NATO, we talked with Dr. Kenneth Moss, Chairman of the National Security Studies Department at the National Defense University in Washington, D.C. Dr. Moss is an expert on the history of U.S. foreign policy, relations between government and industry, and has a unique perspective on the American Congressional role in foreign policy, having worked on Capitol Hill and in private and public sector roles on transatlantic security issues. He is participating in a speaking tour as part of the U.S. State Department’s activities celebrating NATO’s 60th anniversary. As a preview of his visit to France and Germany, we talked with Dr. Moss about a range of subjects. Following are his comments on issues such as the Obama Administration’s approach to NATO, the evolving strategic challenges facing the alliance, and relations with Russia.

CHAPTER ONE: The Obama Administration’s foreign policy orientation regarding NATO

Narrator:

President Obama will attend NATO’s 60th anniversary Summit in France and Germany in April. As one of his first major overseas trips and most visible diplomatic engagement yet with a group of foreign leaders, the question being asked is what the world can expect from the Obama Administration’s foreign policy. Is there a new orientation?

Dr. Kenneth Moss:

I think there is a new orientation. I think with NATO the administration is probably still looking at what it intends to seek from the alliance.

It seemed that many times when I was in Europe, you know you might not get much agreement on many things but there was generally pretty strong agreement on the criticism of George W. Bush. They’ll miss him. You know, this President is – it will be much harder for them to be critical of because he, first of all, tends to represent a view or image of the United States which comes closer to the ideal that many of them would like to have of the U.S.; and he speaks a vocabulary that they more easily understand. It will be much more difficult to disagree with him. There is already this quandary, you know, we know the President’s going to ask more about Afghanistan and NATO. How do you say no to him? Or if you don’t want to say no, what do you offer in place. That’s a tougher question.

Clearly, the primary task in front of the administration right now in terms of how it sees NATO is Afghanistan. And it obviously would like the alliance in a collective sense to be able to do more, contribute more forces, perhaps contribute more resources and capabilities in some of the other missions that are in Afghanistan. But it realizes there are economic restraints, that the economic crisis that has affected the United States if anything is affecting Europe more. There are budgetary problems. And that with a number of NATO countries, there is a combination of constitutional restraint along with the political realities in any particular country - in a sense, can a government sell to its public the importance of a continued role for its forces in Afghanistan.

Clearly the administration would like to find a hurdle for as many of those challenges as possible. I don’t think they have found the formula yet as to how to do that. And of course that then brings you to the broader question of what is NATO’s larger function.

The Obama Administration is going, yes, to continue to look at NATO in terms of what customarily has been called “out-of-area” “non-traditional” types of missions. But I think in doing that, it’s going to have to reconcile its own objectives along side the limitations that will factor into US strategy in the coming years because of the budget and economic considerations; because of the size of US forces and whether or not we will increase them that much; and then the similar boundaries that play with our NATO allies.

Can you continue to work in an alliance under the expectation that it will be primarily an instrument to provide forces and other capabilities in out-of-area missions, or can you perhaps approach the alliance and not necessarily use it or exploit it, but try to find within it a forum in which frankly the United States and a number of NATO countries should address some of the strategic questions that face us in the 21st century.

CHAPTER TWO: NATO’s purpose – the scope of non-traditional operations

Narrator:

In recent years, events such as the 2004 Asian Tsunami and the devastation to Burma’s delta region caused  Cyclone Nargis in May 2008 have raised the profile of the  military role in emergencies and natural disasters. What are the key questions confronting NATO, for example related to humanitarian emergencies?

Dr. Kenneth Moss:

Whether or not humanitarian missions require us to revisit the traditional standards or criteria for intervention that have been in place largely since the end of the second world war. I am not suggesting here that NATO become a replacement or substitute for the United Nations and I think most NATO members would want the UN mandate, UN umbrella before it actually would act. But I think it can be a very good setting where you can discuss some of these questions amongst countries that frankly have the larger assets or capabilities in terms of conducting those types of operations. In the sense of assets, if you look at NATO and then some other countries, yes, including China and Russia, and then traditional U.S. allies such as Japan, Australia, and New Zealand to a lesser extent. These are countries that have many of the assets that are potentially useable in these types of missions and that of course opens questions as to how much NATO should expand its dialogue with other states in the international community. And that, too, is an open question.

But, since the United States and Europe, do still share in many ways a similar strategic outlook on the world, at least based on our desires for democracy, a movement towards a more open economy and the value and merit of each individual and human rights. This is a very good setting to explore those issues and where at least I think proposals can be discussed that then can be carried forth into broader fora such as the United Nations or other settings.

So, yes it might be a humanitarian mission with teeth. I think particularly this administration would want to see it developed under the umbrella of multilateral approval through the UN, through the consent of international law as much as possible and which in some ways is the distinction from certainly the style or modus operandi that we have seen in recent years in U.S. policy.

CHAPTER THREE: NATO’s purpose – major issues confronting the alliance

Narrator:

The scope of non-traditional operations is a growing discussion topic among NATO member nations. The potential for humanitarian emergencies on a larger scale has grown as new security threats have emerged. As a result, NATO faces a new and different set of challenges than in the past. How can NATO come to grips with the new realities affecting security?

Dr. Kenneth Moss:

You have a whole range of issues that are already in place, certainly emerging, such as climate, demography, environment, certainly related to climate but also it has its own particular characteristics separate from that, natural resources and I’m not only talking about oil but, for example, water, energy in other forms besides oil. What some call “transnational issues” because they certainly fall out of the boundaries or limits of traditional states. And yet, of course, NATO is an organization founded in the middle of the twentieth century after the second world war and the beginning of the Cold War composed of states concerned at that time very much with traditional state issues of security and protection of borders and collective security and how can you in a sense enable this alliance to adapt or to change itself in ways that it still can play a constructive part in the international community and be a setting where the United States, it’s European, and one should add North American ally Canada, can discuss these issues but perhaps also discuss them with other countries whether it’s the NATO-Russia Council with Russia or in other settings that would involve non-NATO members. These are definitely uncharted waters and but I think if the United States is going to find any future for NATO, it has to look at it in ways beyond traditional military missions. It has to bring in those issues, those types of transnational developments, that really in many ways are going to be frequent determinants in the future of whether or not United States and other governments have to act through economic and diplomatic intervention and various forms of assistance, or whether ultimately we have to resort to some form of military force. And then of course, what does one do after you have used military force. The aftermath – stabilization, reconstruction – these are very much part of the NATO mission in Afghanistan today, but at a much greater scale, these are the types of questions that would be facing alliance members worldwide.

CHAPTER FOUR: NATO’s future – the role of EU capability

Narrator:

France recently announced that they will rejoin NATO’s integrated command structure more than 40 years after Charles DeGaulle pulled France out in 1966.  Despite criticism, French President Nicolas Sarkozy stated it made no sense for a founding member of NATO such as France to have no say in NATO’s decisions on military strategy. With the Cold War now over and new challenges looming, we asked Dr. Moss about the issue of European capability as NATO looks ahead.

Dr. Kenneth Moss:

I think NATO has a future to play, getting there is going to be very hard. Getting there within a few years I think would be impossible because of the inherent nature of most institutions, they change slowly and also, you’re talking about change at a time when you have major economic dislocation. Change is very hard and there’s another side of this which I think the United States probably needs to address and perhaps this administration will do so more directly. At times we have presented our European allies in NATO with a somewhat schizophrenic message. We want them to do more, we have promoted that particularly through the NATO context, we have certainly given official support on paper and you might say verbally to EU efforts to strengthen their capabilities in security and defense areas but sometimes I would say the follow through on that has much more mixed. We have been uncomfortable with the premise that a capable European Union in defense matters might detract or pull away resources that could be committed to NATO or that the European side of NATO would use the EU to, you might say, “pre-cook” positions that would be developed without any U.S. input. I think we are coming to the point where, and I suspect this administration at least by some of its statements, seems to be prepared to more aggressively encourage EU capabilities in defense and security. And to push those with the recognition that, yes, there may be some tension, but if you’re going to really encourage European attention and European strategic thinking, you need to do that through an EU framework perhaps even more than do through a NATO framework.

CHAPTER FIVE: Realities of US and EU decisionmaking on security matters

Narrator:

The transatlantic relationship is one the most significant in the world certainly in economic terms. The relationship also brings together a group of countries that share certain values rooted in democracy and free societies. Despite agreement on these points, NATO allies often disagree. Dr. Moss addresses the complaint sometimes heard in America that the pace of decision-making in Europe is too slow.

Dr. Kenneth Moss:

It is frustrated by that fact, and at times understandably so. But given Europe’s history in the first half of the twentieth century, there’s an understandable emphasis on the importance of consensus and transparency. Now sometimes the European Union doesn’t follow through as well on transparency. But, anyhow, certainly the members of the EU, particularly the leading members, many of them place a very high emphasis on law, openness of decisions and it was that emphasis that in some ways contributed to the division between us and Europe in 2002-2003 as we prepared for the Iraq war. The need for consensus is slow, but I think the United States needs to appreciate that. We have certainly learned perhaps with difficulty some of the lessons that are paid when you enter into an operation such as the scale of Iraq without the support of key allies and that support counts in many ways besides just operational capability for the military. Therefore, it requires a little more time. I think this new administration is willing to work that process more and recognize that you cannot necessarily obtain fast or quick agreement but part of this is also simply coming down to that fact that what one would call strategic thought in Europe on the EU level is a fairly new development. So, were the EU to address a set of issues and try to develop a strategy, a European strategy is, yes, they have done that but it requires time, it is not an easy process. One can make the same conclusion just looking at the U.S. process. We have difficulty at times creating consensus within our own system. I f you imagine what it would be like with over 20 states trying to craft an agreement amongst themselves. So there is a lot of history - cultural, linguistic – that simply cannot be overcome that quickly. In 60 years, when you look in the sense of what has transpired in Europe, actually it’s remarkable that they have come to the point where they have.

CHAPTER SIX: The Obama Administration’s approach to US-Russia relations

Narrator:

The future of NATO, of course, cannot be completely addressed without considering relations with Russia. As the Obama Administration’s foreign policy team meets and begins working with it’s counterparts in Europe and beyond, many observers are asking if a new approach is being offered.

Dr. Kenneth Moss:

I think, yes, the administration is clearly trying to find new avenues to discuss issues with the Russians. And I think they’re trying to develop these frameworks in ways that are not as dependent on personality as they were perhaps during the first part of the Bush Two administration where the President, at least publicly, put a great deal of emphasis on his relationship with Putin, his ability to read his soul, his personality. And that’s not to say that when you look back in the first part of the second Bush Administration that there weren’t some significant steps. Yes, on the one side, the united States pulled out of the ABM Treaty, but we also continued negotiations with the Russians that led at least to the implementation of the Treaty of Moscow in 2003 which continued the arms reduction framework that had been put into place going back really to the Reagan Administration. But that, by and large, broke up as the following years ensued. Not completely for reasons that can be blamed on the United States. We have to try to determine what Russian motives are as well. There’s a great deal of disagreement on that - as to what their objectives are; why the nationalist turn in their foreign and defense policy; why the concentration of power particularly in the figure of the President; why the elimination of dissent. These are all factors that have to be brought into mind. I think what this administration is trying to do is approach the Russians with an effort to try to look at the question “what are our priorities with Russia”.

CHAPTER SEVEN: US-Russia relations, continued – Ballistic Missile Defense and Iran

Narrator:

Russia remains today an important participant in the major diplomatic challenges facing the international community. At the top of the agenda are two related issues: Ballistic Missile Defense and Iran’s nuclear program. Dr. Kenneth Moss helps us understand the strategic background and recent events such as a letter sent to Russian President Medvedev from President Obama.

Dr. Kenneth Moss:

For example, if you take ballistic missile defense, which the Russians have fixated on. Statistically, ten BMD systems in Poland and a radar system in the Czech Republic are hardly enough to undermine Russia’s strategic capabilities. But one does have to keep in mind history. Russia’s historic interest in protecting its flanks, you might say, from the West; it’s desire for stability on its borders; and I suppose in a sense the sensitivity, at least with the way Putin has tried to play it, that it seemed as if the Americans in particular were trying to rub Russia’s face in the dirt a little bit after the early 1990’s and remind them that, well, you’re no longer the big players that you think you are. And I’m not certain in hindsight that some of the statements we made, some of the steps we took were all that well measured. So the administration I think is trying to find ways of reaching an accommodation with the Russians and to do it through broader frameworks. This letter, I have not read it, so I can only go by press accounts, poses the issue of the status of those BMD systems in the context of Russia’s own concerns with Iran. We know the Russians don’t want the Iranians to have nuclear capabilities in the form of missiles and nuclear warheads. They’re quite happy to supply the Iranians with the technology to support their energy program, and have been doing so, but given Russia’s own problems in the south – a growing Islamic population, interplay that some Iranian Shia leaders have with some sect leaders in the southern part of Russia and the Newly Independent States, now not so newly independent – these are factors that we are trying to appeal to the Russians. We have always made the point it’s the Iranian development of missile capability and the potential of hitting western Europe that was the reason for those BMD capabilities in central Europe anyway. In a sense what we’re telling them – if you can work with us in a way of finding and dissuading the Iranians from taking this course, the systems probably can be removed. It poses a question of the Russians, can they deliver. I guess that’s a question which probably we don’t have complete agreement on as to whether or not they really have that much leverage with Tehran, they certainly have some, we know that. Are they willing to deliver, which is another question. And, if not, what really are your objectives about the systems in central Europe. So in a sense it does force them to put their cards on the table. You know, we also know the Russians have an interest in the stabilization of the Middle East; they’re part of the process. They certainly have interests in the outcome of Iraq and Afghanistan.

CHAPTER EIGHT: German-US relations in the NATO context

Narrator:

Germany has long played a key role in both NATO and transatlantic relations in general. During the Cold War, Germany’s division epitomized the struggle between East and West. What roles can Germany play today in promoting security in Europe?

Dr. Kenneth Moss:

Well, I think the Germans have a real opportunity here to be both a, I would say a good supplement as well as a complement to U.S. objectives with the Russians. After all, to some extent, if the Obama Administration, let’s say, succeeds in its approach to the Russians on the Ballistic Missile Defense issue, that’s going to alleviate a concern that has played a role in German domestic politics ever since the Bush Administration posed the prospect of the deployment of those systems in the Czech Republic and Poland. The Germans have tended to see that as an antagonizing, provocative development in some ways opposite the Russians. They would prefer to see it negotiated rather than to see it evolve in a way that would make the Russians more confrontational towards Europe as well as the United States. And complicate the sensitive framework that exists because of German energy dependence on Russia. And that is certainly a lever the Russians can use. They know it. But it’s to Germany’s advantage, I think, to support the Obama Administration where it can, in encouraging the Russians to take those measures for example in relation to Iran. Also, and here I don’t think the Germans would have that much of a problem either, as the Obama Administration begins to explore avenues for disarmament, whether it is building on the Moscow treaty of several years ago or, you might say, reinvigorating the nuclear non-proliferation treaty and pushing that process forward, something which Germany is very strongly committed to and has played a very important role in. These are developments and trends where the thrust, the direction of Obama’s policies I think parallel or converge potentially very well with German interests and in that sense Germany’s own understanding, it’s own relationship with the Russians, I think it can play an effective role as a facilitator, as a catalyst perhaps, as a setting or venue for some of these types of discussions. That will depend again on I suppose the capabilities of the German government. It is at times constricted by the current grand coalition structure. Of course, you have elections next year in Germany. But in reality the boundaries of German foreign policy aren’t that radically different whether it’s a Social Democrat who sits in the Chancellor’s chair or whether it’s a member of the CDU. There are differences, but not radical differences.

CHAPTER NINE: The significance of Obama’s Muslim heritage for foreign policy and minority relations

Narrator:

In his first major interview after becoming President, Barack Obama sat down with Dubai-based station Al Arabiya. The discussion focused on how the United States and the new administration would emphasize mutual respect, listening, and a new discussion on militarism. How does Obama intend to relate to the Muslim world?

Dr. Kenneth Moss:

Well, I think Obama – simply consider his own background. This is a President who has a radically different background from any occupant in the White House. And I’m speaking not only in terms of race, but also part of his heritage is Muslim. He is aware of that, it makes him aware of the changes in the world; it makes him certainly sensitive to the role, the importance of the Muslim community in the international system. I think he’s trying to find a different vocabulary to approach it. A vocabulary that stresses more cultural understanding, recognition of the values, but also trying to reflect on the similarities that often exist between the broader Christian world and the broader Muslim world. A vocabulary of tolerance and imagery that is quite powerful, I think. I have not traveled recently in the Muslim world, but through correspondence with some professional contacts I have in it, the impact of this President’s election certainly caught its attention. Has it convinced it or persuaded it to drop its doubts or suspicions about the United States – no, not necessarily. But the fact that the United States has elected a President with the middle name of Hussein is not something that you could, not a prospect you could easily consider right now in Germany, or France, or Spain, or Italy. And the fact that Arab-Americans have a per-capita income that is slightly over the national average is also something that is not reflected in most West European settings. There are attributes of American society that in a sense make it more open. At the same time, it is ironic perhaps, I say ironic because in one sense, many Europeans are always astonished about the, and troubled by the religious overtone of some of our political discourse and how at times obsessed Americans seem to be with religion, and yet it is this country which because of its particular approach to separation of state and religion, finds a much easier way of accommodating a non-Christian religious tradition than much as western Europe does, which wrestles with this question of Christian identity.

CHAPTER TEN: The role of Scandinavia in current and emerging security challenges

Narrator:

The countries collectively known as Scandinavia – Norway, Sweden, and Denmark – are long-time allies of the United States. Many Americans may not realize the important role these countries have played in places like Iraq and Afghanistan. And in the future, as Dr. Moss explains, Scandinavian expertise may become a key part of managing emerging security challenges.

Dr. Kenneth Moss:

First of all, I think one of the factors that Americans should keep in mind when you’re talking about Scandinavia collectively is the instrumental role that the countries have played in support of international organizations, international bodies, peacekeeping, peace monitoring efforts. The high levels in terms of percentage of GDP that they contribute to foreign assistance. As we talk ourselves about trying to put more balance into our foreign policy or as we call it down at National Defense University, our national security strategy, less emphasis on the military arm and building some muscle on the other arm. The Scandinavians - consider the size of their resources, both human and economic – have done a significant amount in that area. And they deserve the recognition for it. I think that that type of approach is something we ourselves can learn from. I’ll illustrate with an example. It’s from Afghanistan, in fact. A couple years ago, a Danish scholar provided to me a report that was based on Denmark’s own experiences in northern Afghanistan. What was interesting about it was it already was fleshing out some of the arguments which we only turned to later on in a sense of finding different ways of interacting with the local populace. And the importance of course on reconstruction and stabilization as well as active military missions. And the Danes have in their own way been quite active in Afghanistan. The previous President, President Bush recognized that. The Norwegians, of course, have also been active. They, too have a presence in Afghanistan. Sweden has had this unique neutral status, although it’s sort of a pro-Western neutrality. It’s an EU member now, though. But when you look at that role in multinational peacekeeping, international organizations – options which this new administration is talking about much more, and even I think the issue I talked about in terms of humanitarian intervention – these are questions that the Scandinavians think about a great deal and have something to say on. Another issue that is growing importantly is the whole issue surrounding the status of the Arctic. The impact of global warming, exploration of natural resources in that area, but also how do you handle movement of sea traffic through it; do you do this through international bodies such as the Arctic Council, or do you argue that this is an area where NATO should expand its presence, but along with that people should be asking if you go the NATO route, does that also cause the Russians, in a sense, increasingly view that region as a place of confrontation as well. That’s a significant strategic question that we will have to think about more in the coming decades and beyond. Again, the Scandinavians have an important voice in that. Simply because they’re there, in part, but also they have the institutional memory and experience.